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Introduction
This Topic Brief presents assessments of the 
financial performance of six WSUP-supported 
WASH service delivery models in Bangladesh, 
Madagascar, Mozambique and Zambia. Each model 
has been developed in partnership with locally 
mandated service providers to facilitate sustainable, 
at-scale improvements to low-income urban 
populations.
Balancing financial viability with 
affordability for the low-income customer
The delivery of water and sanitation services which 
adequately serve everyone in a city is a major undertaking: 
essential, challenging and resource-intensive. It requires 
locally mandated service providers (such as water utilities 
and municipalities) to have commitment, capacity, technical 
expertise and recourse to finance. While it is expected of 
these service providers to fulfil their mandates by extending 
services to low-income areas, this is not satisfactorily 
achieved in a majority of cases due to a host of challenges, 
including the key challenge of financial viability. At-scale 
urban WASH services provision is made possible by the 
development of financially viable service delivery models, 
which underpin long-term sustainability by generating 
ongoing revenues to facilitate cost recovery for the service 
provider. At the same time, it is critical that services remain 
affordable for low-income households and reach the city’s 
most vulnerable residents. 
Locating the appropriate balance between financial viability 
and user affordability is at the core of WSUP’s 
programmatic activities. The approach is characterised by a 
number of important nuances specific to the contexts in 
which WSUP and partner institutions operate: 
Long-term cost recovery is the goal 
For the purposes of this publication, the term ‘financial 
viability’ refers primarily to long-term cost recovery - taking 
account of diverse expenditures including public or 
municipal finance, and external support for access to credit 
– and is distinct from the narrower concept of ‘commercial 
viability’ (i.e. profitability). While some of the models 
featured in this publication are already generating a profit 
for the provider (e.g. SWEEP), and others are projected to 
generate profits in the long term, a default expectation 
1   For more information on PPPs, see WSUP’s publication series ‘Public-Private Partnerships explained’ featuring case studies from Bangladesh, Kenya and Zambia.  
Available at www.wsup.com.
that all WASH services and products should be profitable is 
unrealistic. 
Urban sanitation service provision is uniquely 
challenging: ongoing public investment is typically 
required
It is important to recognise fundamental differences in water 
and sanitation services provision. While water services 
provision also requires significant capital investments, and 
is immensely complex in its own right, sanitation is the more 
challenging sector. Sanitation service provision is more 
likely to be impacted by significant constraints including 
unclear institutional frameworks, and variance in consumer 
willingness-to-pay; and will typically require a greater level 
of external support, adaptation and iteration for new service 
delivery models to develop and become sustainable. 
Institutional commitment is pre-requisite and will typically 
need to be backed-up by some form of public investment or 
subsidy: for example, the featured Faecal Sludge 
Management (FSM) service in Kanyama (p.12) has been 
supported by a cross-subsidy from water revenues. In 
WSUP’s view – and as illustrated by the example of 
communal sanitation provision in Maputo (p.14) - the wider 
health, social and economic benefits of improved sanitation 
adequately justify public and municipal finance support on 
the basis of contributing to a public good; and sustainable 
water and sanitation service provision targeted at 
low-income customers has a citywide benefit. 
Eventual uptake of new models is determined by the 
wider enabling environment  
Innovative WASH service delivery models are not 
developed from distance: successful models will fit with 
their particular context, and uptake is contingent on the 
local enabling environment. Institutional and regulatory 
weaknesses present key barriers to achieving sustainability 
and scale. For sanitation in particular, markets and 
consumer demand are likely to require development, though 
the potential is often significant. For both consumer and 
institution-related challenges, a phased, demonstration 
approach to achieving scale can be effective, helping to 
gradually trigger demand and to build the political will 
required for regulatory and institutional reform. Barriers to 
investment should not be underestimated. Fluid and flexible 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) can play an important 
role in helping to share risk, to secure institutional buy-in for 
challenging markets and to address the wider issues 
resulting from weak enabling environments.1
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About the case studies
The Topic Brief features six service delivery models - three 
focused on water and three focused on sanitation - that are 
currently being implemented in WSUP programme 
countries. In each case the aim has been to develop a 
fit-for-purpose model that responds effectively to the needs 
and capacities of local service providers and populations. 
The majority of examples relate to the direct provision of 
services to low-income customers, with the exception of 
Non-Revenue Water reduction (NRW reduction directly 
enhances the financial viability of a utility and improves 
service delivery to existing customers, and can enable 
extending water services provision to low-income areas of 
the city). 
The models are at various stages in their development from 
pilot project to established service. Each has been through 
a process of trial and adaptation, and has demonstrated a 
base level of financial viability to justify continued resource. 
The models could potentially be replicated elsewhere if the 
necessary adaptations are made to suit the individual 
circumstances of a city, its institutions and the 
characteristics of its low-income areas. An overview of the 
six models is presented in Table 1. 
Financial assessments were conducted by WSUP based on 
operational data provided by country teams and institutional 
partners. Each assessment incorporates data on actual 
service performance to date; in four cases, future cash flow 
is projected to indicate the long-term trajectory of the 
service. Key assumptions informing future projections are 
stated for each case study. WSUP will continue to support 
and track the progress of these delivery models and their 
financial performance. More information is available from 
WSUP on request. 
Image: SWEEP FSM service, Dhaka. Credit: WSUP
Table 1: Key characteristics of service delivery models.
Service delivery model Start date Development phase Lead institution People reached  (approx.)
Household water connections, Maputo 2009 Established AdeM 148K 
Kiosk water supply, Antananarivo 2008 Established JIRAMA 235K 
NRW reduction, Antananarivo 2010 Established JIRAMA 713K
FSM service, Dhaka 2015 Emerging DWASA 108K 
FSM service, Lusaka 2013 Emerging LWSC 33K
Communal sanitation facilities, Maputo 2009 Established CMM 5K 
Image: Customer at water kiosk, Lusaka. Credit: Gareth Bentley
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Household water connections for low-income 
customers in Maputo
Maputo has an extensive water network that covers 
most of the central part of the city, including 
low-income districts (known locally as ‘bairros’). 
Until recently, only 1 in 5 households living in these 
bairros had a water connection through the utility, 
Águas da Região de Maputo (AdeM): the remainder 
purchased water from a neighbour, water vendor (at 
exorbitant rates) or the limited and inadequately 
managed water kiosks. Low levels of tertiary 
network coverage in the bairros were constraining 
the spread of house connections, exacerbated by 
the relatively high initial connection cost (MZN 4300, 
equivalent to US$ 73 in today’s currency). AdeM 
and the asset owner FIPAG have since made huge 
strides to address the situation with WSUP’s 
support.  
The service delivery model
WSUP began working in close partnership with AdeM and 
FIPAG in 2009 to improve water services to the bairros. The 
initial aim was two-fold: 1) to demonstrate to the utility that 
supplying water via household connections is commercially 
viable in low-income districts; and 2) to demonstrate to 
households that connecting to the network is an affordable 
way to improve access to water services and quality of life. 
A critical step was the reduction of the connection fee by 
50% (to MZN 2100), with the option of payment by 
instalment over a 12 month period: changes that aligned 
with the government’s pro-poor policy. This connection fee 
subsidy was managed through tariff increases to other 
customers including bulk water supplied to ships. Another 
important step was the strengthening of AdeM operational 
arrangements for service delivery to low-income customers, 
leading to reduced delays in new connections and improved 
billings and revenue collection.
Service uptake and affordability
From 2009 to 2015, WSUP supported FIPAG and AdeM to 
extend networked water access in 13 bairros, including the 
installation of about 100km of new tertiary networks. A 
summary of outcomes is described in Table 1. Of the 
15,400 customers connected to the new network, about 
3,000 were existing customers who were receiving a 
substandard service.  A total population of approximately 
148,500 have benefi ted with access to safe water supply 
through the programme (a number that will increase with 
time). Affordability for low-income customers has been a 
major strength of the programme: combined with WSUP-led 
awareness campaigns, the reduced connection charge and 
option of staged payments contributed to a surge in 
demand, bringing about a 100% increase in water coverage 
in the target bairros from approximately 36% to 73%. 
Financial assessment
In researching this report, fi nancial outcomes were 
assessed and forecasts produced for the programme in 
three bairros - Chamanculo B, Chamanculo D and Unidade 
7 - using data collected during 2014 to 2015. These bairros 
were a priority for AdeM as they lacked tertiary networks 
and were unable to meet demand for individual house 
connections. The programme in the three bairros benefi tted 
approximately 3,630 households (each household 
connection is an AdeM ‘customer’), resulting in improved 
water access to about 18,900 people, but is also expected 
to generate signifi cant revenues for AdeM in the long term. 
This is refl ected in key fi ndings from the fi nancial 
assessment, detailed below:
• Projected net cumulative cash ﬂ ow is positive from 
Year 5 (i.e. 2019). This is based on 1) actual investment 
costs (US$ 261K); 2) estimated operation and 
maintenance costs (US$ 87K); and 3) revenue from 
water consumed by new and existing customers 
transferred to the new networks. The cash fl ow analysis 
adopts current consumption rates, tariffs and allows for 
infl ation. 
Image: Tertiary network construction in Chamanculo, Maputo. Credit: WSUP
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Table 2: Summary of outcomes from the WSUP supported programme (2009 to 2015).
Bairro Year New tertiary network (km)
New 
connections & 
transfers*
Direct people 
reached**
Indirect people 
reached**
Total people 
reached
Household 
coverage****
%
Maxaquene “A” 2009 12.7 3,178 16,526 5,609 22,134 76
Maxaquene ”B” 2010 20.9 2,615 13,598 9,230 22,828 70
Maxaquene “C” 2010 8.2 2,953 15,356 4,607 19,962 77
Liberdade 2011 8.3 420 2,184 NA 2,184 NA
Xipamanine 2011 4.5 352 1,830 7,375 9,205 63
Maxaquene”D” 2012 3.4 240 1,248 11,122 12,370 50
Mafalala 2012 7.0 340 1,768 10,945 12,713 61
Chamanculo C 2013 6.6 1,124 5,845 10,182 16,026 61
Chamanculo B 2014 5.9 760 3,952 1,852 5,804 87
Chamanculo D 2014 5.4 1,233 6,412 3,755 10,167 72
Unidade 7 2015 5.0 1,277 6,640 1,590 8,230 82
Boane 2014 5.1 540 2,808 NA 2,808 NA
Minkadjuine 2015 7.1 368 1,914 2,115 4,028 75
Totals 99.9 15,400 80,080 68,379 148,459
Note: NA – information currently not available.
*Transfers refer to existing customer connections transferred to the new network
**Direct people reached are the population with access to water from new connections
***Indirect people reached are the population with improved access after transferring to the new network
****Household coverage is the percentage of population in the bairro with access to AdeM supply after installation of new network 
• Projected revenue over the 10-year period is 
estimated at US$ 630k with a net gain of 
approximately US$ 369k. As such, the assessment 
confi rms the fi nancial viability of the model: this is also 
refl ected in a Net Present Value (NPV) of US$ 22k over 
the 10-year period based on a 21.5% discount rate2 (on 
a capital investment of US$ 261k); and an Internal Rate 
of Return (IRR)3 of 25.6% based on capital 
expenditures.
Figure 1: Forecast cost-benefi t analysis of water supply through 
tertiary networks (Chamanculo B, Chamanculo D and Unidade 7 bairros).
2  The Central Bank’s benchmark interest rate at July 2017.
3   IRR is a frequently used fi nancial performance indicator in development projects and is the discount rate that makes the Net Present Value (NPV) of all cash fl ows from a particular project 
equal to zero.
Conclusion
Programme outcomes in Maputo show the importance of 
developing service delivery approaches that are affordable 
to potential customers and fi nancially attractive to the 
service provider. The development of the model was made 
possible by two key decisions: fi rstly, to bridge the initial gap 
in service delivery through new tertiary networks requiring 
relatively low capital investments; and secondly, the political 
decision to lower the connection charge. The charge was 
previously set at a level that disincentivised new customers, 
resulting in loss of potential revenue for the utility, as well as 
undermining the Government’s pro-poor policies. The 
positive engagement and consultations between the service 
provider and the households enabled designing appropriate 
and cost effective layouts for the tertiary networks within the 
bairros, key to the sustainability of service delivery.
The decision to lower the connection charge was taken by 
the government resulting from the dialogue between civil 
society actors, AdeM, the regulator (CRA) and the asset 
owner (FIPAG), illustrating the power of collaboration and 
consultation in the water sector. Also evident is the value of 
awareness-raising campaigns in low-income communities, 
aimed at giving households a better understanding of utility 
services, including payment options and contractual 
arrangements for new customers. Many low-income 
households already pay high prices for water from an 
informal supplier: the programme refl ects WSUP’s broader 
experience that such customers are willing to pay by 
instalment for a cheaper, formal utility connection if given 
the opportunity.  
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Kiosk water supply for low-income customers in 
Antananarivo
Madagascar is among the poorest countries in 
Africa, with an estimated 92% of the population 
living on less than $2 per day, and correspondingly 
low levels of water and sanitation coverage.4 Access 
to safe and affordable water services is a high 
priority for rapidly expanding cities such as the 
capital Antananarivo (Tana), where water of good 
quality is supplied by the national utility JIRAMA via 
an established pipe network. However, access to 
water in Tana is limited or unavailable in many parts 
of the central municipal area (Commune Urbane 
Antananarivo, CUA) and the surrounding 43 
peri-urban Communes (municipalities) that comprise 
the city; and where water is available, many 
low-income households cannot afford the cost of a 
connection.  
In response to the above challenges, WSUP has worked in 
partnership with key stakeholders to demonstrate and 
scale-up a sustainable model for water access for a large 
population of low-income consumers in Tana, the key 
features of which are listed below. 
The service delivery model
• Access is achieved through a network of purpose built 
water kiosks connected to the city water supply network 
operated by JIRAMA. 
• Water User Associations (WUAs) operate the water 
kiosks through a formalised Delegated Management 
Contract with the Communes (the asset owners). 
• Each kiosk serves up to 500 persons (100 households) 
living within a radius of about 100-150 metres, at the 
affordable water tariff of 1 Ariary per litre (a 20-litre 
Jerry can of water costs the equivalent of US$ 0.7 
cents).  
• Consultations and partnership between the benefi ciary 
communities, JIRAMA and the Communes underpin 
the model.
• A consultative market research procedure is applied for 
identifying and selecting preferred locations for the 
kiosks (termed Community Infrastructure Location 
Assessment procedure, CILA).5
4  World Bank (2014) Appraisal Document: Second Integrated Growth Poles and Corridor Programme.
5  WSUP (2011) Practice Note #006: Location is everything: optimal placement of community water and sanitation service.
6  http://www.wsup.com/2016/03/21/water-sanitation-investments-create-jobs/.
Programme outcomes
The WSUP programme began with an initial pilot of 10 
water kiosks in 2008 and has achieved signifi cant scale-up: 
in the period to 2016 the programme helped install and 
operate a network of 472 water kiosks and laundry blocks 
(the latter provide washing facilities in addition to water 
supplies). The facilities cover the central CUA and 16 
peri-urban communes, providing access to good quality 
affordable water to over 47,000 households (a population of 
about 235,000): an analysis by PwC indicates the 
programme has made a signifi cant contribution to their 
quality of life including improved health due to a reduction in 
water borne diseases as well as economic and social 
benefi ts.6  The water delivery model is now being replicated 
in other cities in Madagascar and helping to contribute to 
the Ministry of WASH target to achieve universal access to 
water by 2025. The coverage of water kiosks and laundry 
blocks is summarised in Table 3.
Image: Collecting water at water kiosk, Antananarivo. Credit: WSUP
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Financial assessment
The kiosks yield a gross margin of 640 Ariary per m3 of 
water sales (US$ 21 cents) to the WUAs, while providing 
signifi cant water supply tariff revenue to JIRAMA (see Table 
3). Although the net margins per kiosk are relatively small, 
many of the WUAs manage several kiosks within their 
Commune, giving them the opportunity to generate 
reasonable levels of cash fl ows and profi ts. These net 
profi ts are ploughed back into community development 
projects including drainage and solid waste as well as 
investing in new kiosks.
While established WUAs are positioned to support 
construction of new kiosks from their own profi ts, capital 
costs for kiosks provided under the programme are not 
typically recovered. In WSUP’s view this is clearly 
justifi able: the kiosks are public assets and investments in 
the long term are expected to be mobilised through public 
and municipal fi nance with the private sector also being 
involved (WUAs and local enterprises). In order to provide 
support with fi nancing, WSUP contributed the cost of 
infrastructure works undertaken under the WSUP 
programme (about US$ 3,000 per water kiosk) with the 
Communes contributing the cost of connections to 
JIRAMA’s water network (at an average of about US$ 2,000 
per water kiosk). 
An analysis of actual operational data for a sample of eight 
water kiosks is summarised in Table 3. The fi nal column is 
included to illustrate the fi nancial outcomes a WUA can 
expect if operating at a representative scale of 10 water 
kiosks. 
Table 3: Financial outturn from water kiosk operations.
Item Per Kiosk per Year Per 10 KiosksPer year (US$)
Ariary (MGA)* US$ % of  WUArevenue
WUA 
Revenue 2,580,000 860 100% 8,600
Payment to 
JIRAMA 780,000 260 30% 2,600
Gross 
margin to 
WUA
1,800,000 600 70% 6,000
Operating 
costs (of 
WUA)**
1,470,000 490 57% 4,900
Net margin 
to WUA 330,000 110 13% 1,100
*Malagasy Ariary (US$1 = MGA 3000)
**Includes salary of operators, WUA establishment costs and 
maintenance of water kiosks
7   In order to better understand the social and economic benefi ts of programme reforms, WSUP commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to apply the Total Impact Measurement & 
Management (TIMM) framework to WSUP-supported JIRAMA activities in Antananarivo. The analysis estimated that between 2013 and 2025, the total health benefi ts from reduction in 
diarrhoeal disease among users of (WSUP-supported) JIRAMA water kiosks are estimated to be US$ 36 million. Net time and monetary savings associated with shorter journeys to collect 
water as a result of water kiosks provided under the programme are estimated to be US$ 0.8m and US$ 21,000 respectively. Earnings generated as a result of JIRAMA water kiosks and 
laundry blocks between 2013 and 2025 were estimated at US$ 5.1m. Of this total, 70% is earned by women as a result of the high proportion of female laundry block operators.
Figure 2: Financial outcome from operation of 10 Water Kiosks
(gross revenue: US$ 8,600).
Conclusion
WSUP’s experience in Tana demonstrates that utility 
service delivery to underserved communities can yield 
satisfactory returns on investment. The fi nancial viability of 
the model is underpinned by the partnership approach 
involving JIRAMA, communes and target communities. 
Structuring the service delivery as a business model 
motivated the WUAs to manage the operations effectively to 
achieve net fi nancial return; and helped deliver a safe water 
supply to thousands of low-income consumers who would 
otherwise pay more than utility customers for water from an 
informal (and often polluted) water source. 
As the model continues to be refi ned, there is a case to 
undertake a consultation for a small increase in the water 
tariff to provide a contribution to the capital costs for new 
water kiosks (as well as enhancing greater private sector 
participation), while maintaining affordability for the poorer 
segments of the population. Nonetheless, in WSUP’s view 
the value of ‘public good’ investments such as water kiosks 
- in this case equating to approximately US$ 10 per 
consumer - cannot be overstated. Such capital investments 
help to bridge gaps for essential services, and as 
demonstrated by a recent analysis commissioned by 
WSUP, bring innumerable benefi ts in terms of improved 
health, economic and social outcomes.7 
The success of the service delivery model is refl ected in the 
increasing network of water kiosks in Tana; and in the 
model’s adoption in other cities across Madagascar. This 
scale-up already underway is helping to leverage further 
investments as the model continues to build momentum. 
 
WUA 
Payment to 
JIRAMA
$2,600
Operating 
Costs
$4,900
WUA 
Profi t 
$1,100
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NRW reduction to enhance the fi nancial viability 
of the utility in Antananarivo
Non-Revenue Water (NRW) is water that does not 
generate revenue for the utility from its point of 
processing to its endpoint. NRW is usually assessed 
under physical and commercial losses and can be 
caused by infrastructural problems (such as leaking 
pipes) or commercial issues such as incorrect 
billing, faulty meters and illegal connections to the 
water network. Utilities with high NRW rates cannot 
provide a sustained and reliable service for their 
customers, and often lack the capacity to fi x 
problems or extend the network. Customers can 
then become reluctant to pay for a poor service, 
further reducing the revenue available for network 
improvements (the negative NRW cycle is 
conceptualised in Figure 3).
WSUP has been supporting the water utility JIRAMA in the 
capital Antananarivo (Tana) since 2010 with their NRW 
reduction programme, aiming to improve the utility’s 
fi nancial effi ciency and overall performance. Leakages from 
the city’s ageing water pipe network, coupled with the lack 
of a planned NRW approach, were losing the utility an 
estimated 19-20 million m3 of water per year8; JIRAMA 
struggled to provide an adequate service to its existing 
customers and was unable to extend services into new 
areas.
Figure 3: Negative NRW cycle9
Source: USAID (2010) The Manager’s Non-Revenue Water Handbook for 
Africa.
The NRW programme
JIRAMA’s priority was to establish greater control over 
Tana’s water fl ows, to curb leakages and reduce NRW. 
Key features of the NRW programme were as follows: 
8  JIRAMA water balance analysis, 2015.
9   For more information on planning and implementing NRW reduction programmes, see WSUP (2017) A guide to Non-Revenue Water reduction: how to limit losses, strengthen commercial 
viability and improve services. 
10  For more information on JIRAMA’s NRW reduction programme in Tana, see WSUP (2017) Non-Revenue Water reduction: a critical step towards commercial viability. 
District Metered Areas (DMAs) were set up in all 
peri-urban areas covered by the JIRAMA network and in 
parts of central Tana: water piped to these zones can be 
measured and isolated, so JIRAMA staff can identify leaks 
and undertake active leakage management. This vital 
information on water fl ow enables continuous monitoring 
through water balance analyses and helps to control water 
loss. The remaining areas of central Tana uncovered by 
DMAs will be covered over the next few years. 
Pressure Reducing Valves (PRVs) were introduced to 
deal with pressure management including reducing nightly 
leakage rates and improving water delivery.
Capacity building and institutional reforms within 
JIRAMA saw the establishment of a strategic unit dedicated 
to NRW, a leakage detection and reparation service and a 
low-income consumer unit. These structural changes led to 
the embedding of NRW management within JIRAMA’s 
service delivery process and enabled staged and 
systematic roll-out across Tana’s operating zones.10
Programme outcomes
The NRW programme has resulted in signifi cant water 
effi ciency savings across Tana which will continue to 
increase with time (see Table 4), confi rming the 
programme’s value to both the utility and existing 
customers. WSUP’s support to JIRAMA was provided in 
return for a commitment to improve service delivery to the 
city’s low-income areas, formalised through a Professional 
Services Agreement (PSA). JIRAMA has honoured this 
NRW cycle
Expenditure is 
concentrated on 
meeting increasing 
consumer demands
Operational budgets 
are reduced 
especially in areas of 
network maintenance
Revenues decrease 
and operational 
costs increase
NRW increases
Negative 
NRW Cycle
Image: JIRAMA NRW team in the fi eld. Credit: WSUP
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agreement and demonstrated their fi rm commitment to 
extending coverage to poorly served low-income areas in 
Tana: WSUP estimates that more than 710,000 low-income 
consumers have benefi ted from the NRW reduction 
programme since 2010.11
Table 4: Summary of outcomes from JIRAMA’s NRW programme from 
2012-2015.
Pre-programme (2012) Mid-programme (2015) 
NRW (South zone) 48% 39% 
Total water supplied Increased by 12 million m3 from 2012-2015
Water saved 1.44 million m3 3.6 million m3
Continuity of supply 3 hours per day 6 to 24 hours per day
Financial assessment
In researching this report, fi nancial outcomes were 
assessed and forecast for the NRW programme over the 
period 2011 - 2020. Figure 4 shows that during the period of 
analysis, JIRAMA’s net cumulative cash fl ow from the NRW 
programme will be positive from year 7 (2017). This is 
based on the actual investment costs, together with the 
estimated operation and maintenance costs, and revenue 
from water saved from the recorded fl ow data and water 
balance analysis. The attractive fi nancial returns of the 
programme are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Summary of fi nancial assessment and forecast for JIRAMA’s 
NRW programme, 2011-2020.
Estimated revenue US$ 4.7 m
Net fi nancial gain (allowing for 
O&M costs)
US$ 2.4m
Net present value (NPV)4 US$ 323K
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 16.3%
12 
Figure 4: Forecast cost-benefi t analysis for JIRAMA’s NRW programme, 
2011-2020.
11   The impacts of NRW programmes are far-reaching and diffi cult to quantify. The above fi gure represents the total number of people reached through WSUP programme support to JIRAMA: 
the NRW programme has impacted positively on JIRAMA’s overall fi nancial viability and contributed to improved service delivery in all aspects, including (for example) improved continuity 
of supply to existing customers, and extension of the network to previously unserved low-income areas.
12   Calculated on a 10% discount rate on a capital investment of US$ 2.32m over a 10-year period. Based on capital and operation and maintenance expenditures. The discount rate is based 
on the current relatively low commercial interest rates in Madagascar following the Central Bank’s cut in the benchmark lending rate to 8.3% in May 2015. The commercial interest rate in 
July 2017 was 9.0% (www.ieconomics.com).
Figure 5: Financial outcomes of JIRAMA’s NRW Programme, 2012-2015 
(US$).
 Conclusion
A high level of water loss is one of the major challenges 
facing water utilities across the developing world. JIRAMA’s 
experience demonstrates the power of NRW reduction 
programmes to improve both commercial viability for the 
utility and outcomes for the consumer: signifi cant reductions 
in water losses have been achieved in Tana with relatively 
low levels of investment, resulting in increased revenue for 
JIRAMA, better services for its customers and the 
extension of services to underserved areas.
Mainstreaming NRW within the utility’s operating processes 
requires systemic change that includes institutional reform 
and allocation of resources. For utilities embarking on a 
structured NRW programme, a phased approach helps to 
develop sustainability and embed NRW as part of utility 
operations. Capacity building and training are key to 
ensuring best practice and long term sustainability. WSUP’s 
experience suggests that NRW reduction programmes 
should be considered an integral component of utility 
pro-poor strategies, with part of the water and revenue 
saved being leveraged to serve underserved areas. Utilities 
should fi rst invest in NRW reduction prior to making 
signifi cant capital investments in increasing water capacity. 
Investment 
costs 
($2.32M)
Net 
margin/ 
profi t  
($2.36M)
O&M costs 
($1.0M)
Image: JIRAMA NRW team conducting leak detection and repair. Credit: WSUP
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FSM services through Public-Private Partnership 
in Dhaka
Dhaka is one of the world’s megacities, with a 
population of around 16 million. The clear majority of 
residents (80%) are dependent on on-site sanitation 
systems, yet until recently, no private operator 
existed to provide mechanical emptying services to 
this vast and largely untapped market. WSUP has 
worked to address this service gap through an 
innovative Public Private Partnership (PPP) between 
Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority 
(DWASA) and a local SME (Gulshan Clean and 
Care - GCC). The FSM service - marketed under 
the brand name ‘SWEEP’ - became profi table on an 
O&M basis within fi ve months of start-up, and 
provides a replicable model which is already being 
rolled-out in Bangladesh’s second city, Chittagong. 
The service delivery model
SWEEP teams use two DWASA-owned vacuum tankers 
(with 2000-litre capacity), accessed on a subsidised lease 
agreement, to empty septic tanks in private houses and 
public and commercial institutions. Waste is disposed of 
through the sewer network into DWASA’s treatment facility 
in Pagla. The PPP arrangement that underpins SWEEP is 
designed to incentivise both parties. In return for 
compliance with regulation, a security deposit, and a 
monthly lease fee paid to DWASA, GCC did not have to pay 
for the acquisition of technology at the start-up stage (this 
would have been prohibitively expensive - an estimated 4 
million BDT). Under the lease contract, roles are split 
between DWASA and GCC (see Table 6). 
Service uptake and affordability
Customer septic tanks are grouped by the SWEEP 
business into three categories: small (6-16 m3), medium 
(16-32 m3) and large (48-224 m3). During SWEEP’s initial 
phase of operation, large septic tanks accounted for 
approximately 17% of customers but 60% of SWEEP’s 
revenue (this customer group predominantly consists of 
middle- and high-income customers, including institutional 
customers such as hotels). SWEEP customers living in 
low-income areas are charged a lower tariff of $6-7.50 per 
cubic metre, compared to US$ 10-15 for middle/
high-income and institutional customers; these tariffs 
correspond to service fees ranging from US$ 60-75 for 
small septic tanks, US$ 150 for medium septic tanks and 
US$ 250-1000 for large septic tanks. However, the pricing 
structure is not fi xed, given the widespread practice in 
Dhaka of negotiation over price for services rendered. The 
services have reached approximately 146,000 people 
during SWEEP’s initial 26 months in operation in Dhaka, 
with an average 110 tanker loads collected and emptied per 
month. 
Financial assessment
Figure 6 presents an overview of SWEEP’s performance 
during the fi rst 26 months of operation. As anticipated, the 
untried and innovative service required time to develop 
customer demand and overcome operational challenges: 
this was refl ected in the low levels of revenue during the fi rst 
fi ve months followed by the gradual increase in demand. 
The operator response to the market has been to target a 
reasonable proportion of medium and large customers who 
provide a higher fi nancial margin despite requiring more 
time per customer. The gross revenue generated was 
approximately US$ 2,260 per month with a net margin of 
about US$ 404 per month. The vacuum tankers are leased 
from DWASA at a reduced rate, so the model has low 
capital costs; together with effective management and 
marketing, this led to positive net cash fl ow being achieved 
within fi ve months of start-up. 
Image: Kamrul Islam, owner of Gulshan Clean and Care. Credit: WSUP
Table 6: Allocation of responsibilities for the FSM service between DWASA and GCC.
Regular 
operational 
activities
Regular maintenance 
activities
Vehicle maintenance 
activities
Mobilising and 
responding to 
demand
Mass marketing Regulatory activities
Replacing and 
increasing fl eet
Disposal and 
treatment
SME SME DWASA SME DWASA DWASA DWASA DWASA
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Figure 6: Overview of SWEEP’s performance (US$), April 2015 – May 2017. 
Net Income (Loss) represents total revenue plus total expenditure since 
inception of the service; Income (Loss) represents monthly revenue plus 
monthly expenses.
Figure 7 presents the current and projected fi nancial 
performance of SWEEP based on an internal WSUP 
analysis using available operational data and stakeholder 
consultations. The fi nancial performance refl ects the actual 
operational data from April 2015 to November 201613, and 
projections for the next eight years, which includes the 
continuation of the current preferential lease arrangement of 
the two vacuum tankers from DWASA. The customer profi le 
assumes a larger and realistic proportion of medium and 
large customers (70%) which provides a sustainable 
revenue stream. The signifi cant untapped market for FSM 
services underpins the potential for the business to grow 
and extend, even with relatively modest growth forecasts of 
10% per annum. The Net Present Value (NPV) at 15% 
discount rate14 is estimated as $98k over a 10-year period 
based on operation and maintenance expenditures. If these 
forecasts are realised, SWEEP would reach over 200,000 
people in the year 2025. 
Figure 7: SWEEP fi nancial assessment and forecast for FSM services in 
Dhaka.
13  Updated fi nancial performance refl ecting actual operational data to May 2017 will be included in Version 2 of this document (forthcoming).
14  Term loan interest rates to small businesses, Bangladesh Bank, July 2017.
Figure 8: SWEEP forecast for people reached in Dhaka, April 2015-March 
2025.
Conclusion
SWEEP’s experience shows it is possible for mechanical 
FSM services to make a profi t on an O&M basis in a large 
Bangladeshi city such as Dhaka. SWEEP was given the 
platform to succeed through its partnership with DWASA, 
who agreed to provide vacuum tankers through a 
preferential lease agreement; and by initial support from 
WSUP to develop a profi le, revenue stream and overcome 
operational challenges. The vast and largely untapped 
market for FSM in cities like Dhaka provides signifi cant 
potential for private sector services, which SWEEP has 
shown can be established with relatively low levels of 
investment (outside of capital expenditures). The success of 
the service in Dhaka has resulted in the model being 
adopted by Chittagong City Corporation, with replication in 
other major cities in Bangladesh a very real possibility. 
With SWEEP now established as a commercially viable 
business, incentivising service provision to low-income 
areas is a critical consideration. WSUP is currently 
analysing data from the operator to better understand 
necessary price points for higher- and lower-income 
customers that would allow for differentiated pricing in order 
to target households in low-income areas - currently around 
30% of the total customer base - while maintaining a healthy 
bottom line for the business. Another core area of activity 
will be strengthening the regulatory framework for onsite 
sanitation in urban Bangladesh. In a signifi cant step 
forward, a new institutional regulatory framework for FSM 
has recently been approved and is expected to provide the 
long-term foundations for improved regulation and 
enforcement relating to FSM service provision. 
per	 month	 with	 a	 net	 margin	 of	 about	 US$	 404	 per	 month.	 The	 vacuum	 tankers	 are	 leased	 from	
DWASA	at	a	 reduced	 rate,	 so	 the	model	has	 low	capital	 costs;	 together	with	effective	management	
and	marketing,	this	led	to	positive	net	cash	flow	being	achieved	within	five	months	of	start-up.		
Figure	1:	Overview	of	SWEEP’s	performance	(US$),	April	2015	–	May	2017.	Net	Income	(Loss)	represents	total	revenue	plus	
total	expenditure	since	inception	of	the	service;	Income	(Loss)	represents	monthly	revenue	plus	monthly	expenses. 
 
	
Figure	 2	 presents	 the	 current	 and	 projected	 financial	 performance	 of	 SWEEP	 based	 on	 an	 internal	
WSUP	 analysis	 using	 available	 operational	 data	 and	 stakeholder	 consult tions.	 The	 financial	
performance	reflects	the	actual	operational	data	from	April	2015	to	November	2016,	and	projections	
for	the	next	eight	years,	which	includes	the	continuation	of	the	current	preferential	lease	arrangement	
of	 the	 two	 vacuum	 tankers	 from	 DWASA.	 The	 customer	 profile	 assumes	 a	 larger	 and	 realistic	
proportion	of	medium	and	 large	customers	(70%)	which	provides	a	sustainable	revenue	stream.	The	
significant	 untapped	market	 for	 FSM	 services	 underpins	 the	 potential	 for	 the	 business	 to	 grow	 and	
extend,	even	with	relatively	modest	growth	forecasts	of	10%	per	annum.	The	Net	Present	Value	(NPV)	
at	 15%	discount	 rate	 is	 estimated	as	 $98k.	 If	 these	 forecasts	 are	 realised,	 SWEEP	would	 reach	over	
200,000	people	in	the	year	2025.		
Figure	2:	SWEEP	financial	assessment	and	forecast	for	FSM	services	in	Dhaka	
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Figure	3:	SWEEP	beneficiary	forecast	in	Dhaka,	April	2015-March	2025	
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relatively	low	levels	of	investment	(outside	of	capital	costs).	The	success	of	the	service	in	Dhaka	has	
resulted	in	the	model	being	adopted	by	Chittagong	City	Corporation,	with	replication	in	other	major	
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With	SWEEP	now	established	as	a	commercially	viable	business,	incentivising	service	provision	to	low-
income	are s	is	a	critical	consi eration.	WSUP	is	curr ntly	analysing	data	from	the	operator	to	better	
understand	 ecessary	price	points	for	higher-	and	lower-income	customers	that	would	allow	for	
differentiated	pricing	in	order	to	target	households	in	low-income	areas	-	currently	around	30%	of	the	
total	customer	base	-	while	maintaining	a	healthy	bottom	line	for	the	business.	Another	core	area	of	
activity	will	be	strengthening	the	regulatory	framework	for	onsite	sanitation	in	urban	Bangladesh.	In	a	
significant	step	forward,	a	draft	regulatory	framework	for	FSM	has	recently	been	approved	and	is	
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U
S
$
Years: April 2015 to March 2025
Revenue Operating & Overhead Costs Net Profit
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
o.
 o
f b
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
Year (Apr.2015 to Mar. 2025)
Actual data Apr. 2015 to Nov.2016
Comment [SD2]: Baghi	-	to	save	space	I	suggest	deleting	this	-	I	
think	it	can	be	adequately	conveyed	in	the	text,	and	Figures	1	and	2	
are	more	valuable.		
	
Figure	3:	SWEEP	bene iciary	forecast	in	Dhak ,	April	2015-M rch	2025	
	
	
Conclusion	
SWEEP’s	experience	shows	it	is	possible	for	mechanical	FSM	services	to	make	a	profit	on	an	O&M	
basis	in	a	large	Bangladeshi	city	such	as	Dhaka.	SWEEP	was	given	the	platform	to	succeed	through	its	
partnership	with	DWASA,	who	agreed	to	provide	vacuum	tankers	through	a	preferential	lease	
agreement;	and	by	initial	support	from	WSUP	to	develop	a	profile,	revenue	stream	and	overcome	
operati nal	c allenges.	The	vast	and	largely	unta ped	market	for	FSM	in	cities	like	Dhaka	provides	
significant	potential	f r	private	sector	services,	which	SWEEP	has	shown	can	be	established	with	
relatively	low	levels	of	invest ent	(outside	of	capital	costs).	The	success	of	the	service	in	Dhaka	has	
resulted	in	the	model	being	adopted	by	Chittagong	City	Corporation,	with	replication	in	other	major	
cities	in	Bangladesh	a	very	real	possibility.		
With	SWEEP	now	established	as	a	commercially	viable	business,	incentivising	service	provision	to	low-
income	areas	is	a	critical	consideration.	WSUP	is	currently	analysing	data	from	the	operator	to	better	
understand	necessary	price	points	for	higher-	and	lower-income	customers	that	would	allow	for	
differentiated	pricing	in	order	to	target	households	in	low-income	areas	-	currently	around	30%	of	the	
total	customer	base	-	while	maintaining	a	healthy	bottom	line	for	the	business.	Another	core	area	of	
activity	will	be	strengthening	the	regulatory	framework	for	onsite	sanitation	in	urban	Bangladesh.	In	a	
significant	step	forward,	a	draft	r gulatory	framework	for	FSM	has	recently	been	approved	and	is	
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U
S
$
Years: April 2015 to March 2025
Revenue Operating & Overhead Costs Net Profit
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
o.
 o
f b
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
Year (Apr.2015 to Mar. 2025)
Actual data Apr. 2015 to Nov.2016
Comment [SD2]: Baghi	-	to	save	space	I	suggest	deleting	this	-	I	
think	it	can	be	adequately	conveyed	in	the	text,	and	Figures	1	and	2	
are	more	valuable.		
N
o.
 o
f p
eo
pl
e 
re
ac
he
d
	
Figure	3:	SWEEP	beneficiary	forecast	in	Dhaka,	April	2015-March	2025	
	
	
Conclusion	
SWEEP’s	experience	shows	it	is	possible	for	mechanical	FSM	services	to	make	a	profit	on	an	O&M	
basis	in	a	large	Bangladeshi	city	such	as	Dhaka.	SWEEP	was	given	the	platform	to	succeed	through	its	
partnership	with	DWASA,	who	agreed	to	provide	vacuum	tankers	through	a	preferential	lease	
agreement;	and	by	initial	support	from	WSUP	to	develop	a	profile,	revenue	stream	and	overcome	
operational	challenges.	The	vast	and	largely	untapped	market	for	FSM	in	cities	like	Dhaka	provides	
significant	potential	for	private	sector	services,	which	SWEEP	has	shown	can	be	established	with	
relatively	low	levels	of	investment	(outside	of	capital	costs).	The	success	of	the	service	in	Dhaka	has	
resulted	in	the	model	being	adopted	by	Chittagong	City	Corporation,	with	replication	in	other	major	
cities	in	Bangladesh	a	very	real	possibility.		
With	SWEEP	now	established	as	a	commercially	viable	business,	incentivising	service	provision	to	low-
income	areas	is	a	critical	consideration.	WSUP	is	currently	analysing	data	from	the	operator	to	better	
understand	necessary	price	points	for	higher-	and	lower-income	customers	that	would	allow	for	
differentiated	pricing	in	order	to	target	households	in	low-income	areas	-	currently	around	30%	of	the	
total	customer	base	-	while	maintaining	a	healthy	bottom	line	for	the	business.	Another	core	area	of	
activity	will	be	strengthening	the	regulatory	framework	for	onsite	sanitation	in	urban	Bangladesh.	In	a	
significant	step	forward,	a	draft	regulatory	framework	for	FSM	has	recently	been	approved	and	is	
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U
S
$
Years: April 2015 to March 2025
Revenue Operating & Overhead Costs Net Profit
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
o.
 o
f b
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
Year (Apr.2015 to Mar. 2025)
Actual data Apr. 2015 to Nov.2016
Comment [SD2]: Baghi	-	to	save	space	I	suggest	deleting	this	-	I	
think	it	can	be	adequately	conveyed	in	the	text,	and	Figures	1	and	2	
are	more	valuable.		
	
Figure	3:	SWEEP	beneficiary	forecast	in	Dhaka,	April	2015-March	2025	
	
	
Conclusion	
SWEEP’s	experience	shows	it	is	possible	for	mechanical	FSM	services	to	make	a	profit	on	an	O&M	
basis	in	a	large	Bangladeshi	city	such	as	Dhaka.	SWEEP	was	given	the	platform	to	succeed	through	its	
partnership	with	DWASA,	who	agreed	to	provide	vacuum	tankers	through	a	preferential	lease	
agreement;	and	by	initial	support	from	WSUP	to	develop	a	profile,	revenue	stream	and	overcome	
operational	challenges.	The	vast	and	largely	untapped	market	for	FSM	in	cities	like	Dhaka	provides	
significant	potential	for	private	sector	services,	which	SWEEP	has	shown	can	be	established	with	
relatively	low	levels	of	investment	(outside	of	capital	costs).	The	success	of	the	service	in	Dhaka	has	
resulted	in	the	model	being	adopted	by	Chittagong	City	Corporation,	with	replication	in	other	major	
cities	in	Bangladesh	a	very	real	possibility.		
With	SWEEP	now	established	as	a	commercially	viable	business,	incentivising	service	provision	to	low-
income	areas	is	a	critical	consideration.	WSUP	is	currently	analysing	data	from	the	operator	to	better	
understand	necessary	price	points	for	higher-	and	lower-income	customers	that	would	allow	for	
differentiated	pricing	in	order	to	target	households	in	low-income	areas	-	currently	around	30%	of	the	
total	customer	base	-	while	maintaining	a	healthy	bottom	line	for	the	business.	Another	core	area	of	
activity	will	be	strengthening	the	regulatory	framework	for	onsite	sanitation	in	urban	Bangladesh.	In	a	
significant	step	forward,	a	draft	regulatory	framework	for	FSM	has	recently	been	approved	and	is	
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U
S
$
Years: April 2015 to March 2025
Revenue Operating & Overhead Costs Net Profit
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
o.
 o
f b
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
Year (Apr.2015 to Mar. 2025)
Actual data Apr. 2015 to Nov.2016
Comme t [SD2]: Baghi	-	to	save spac I	suggest	deleting	this	- I	
think	it	can	be	ad quately	conveyed	in	the	text,	and	Figures	1	and	2	
are	more	valuable.		
	
Figure	3:	SWEEP	beneficiary	forecast	in	Dhaka,	April	2015-March	2025	
	
	
Conclusion	
SWEEP’s	experience	shows	it	is	possible	for	mechanical	FSM	services	to	make	a	profit	on	an	O&M	
b sis	in	a	large	Bangladeshi	city	such	as	Dhaka.	SWEEP	was	giv n	the	platform	to	succeed	through	its	
partnership	with	DWASA,	who	agreed	to	provide	vacuum	tankers	through	a	pr ferential	lease	
agreeme t;	and	by	initial	support	from	WSUP	to	develop	a	profile,	reve ue	stream	and	overcom 	
operational	challenges.	The	vast	and	largely	untapped	market	for	FSM	in	cities	like	Dhaka	provides	
significant	pot ntial	for	private	sect r	services,	which	SWEEP	 as	shown	can	be	 stablished	with	
r latively	low	levels	of	investment	(outside	of	capital	costs).	The	success	of	the	service	in	Dhaka	has	
resulted	in	the	model	b ing	adopted	by	Chittagong	City	Corporation,	with	replication	in	other	major	
cities	in	Bangladesh	a	very	real	possibility.		
With	SWEEP	now	established	as	a	commercially	viabl 	business,	i centivising	service	provision	to	low-
income	 reas	is	a	critical	consideration.	WSUP	is	currently	analysing	data	from	the	 per t r	to	better	
understand	necessary	price	points	for	higher-	an 	lower-income	customers	that	would	allow	for	
differentiated	pricing	in	order	to	t rget	households	in	l w-i come	areas	-	currently	around	30%	of	the	
total	customer	base	-	while	maintaining	a	healthy	bottom	line	for	the	business.	Another	core	area	of	
activity	will	be	strengthening	the	regulatory	framework	for	onsite	sanitation	in	urban	Bangl desh.	In	a	
significant	step	forward,	a	draft	regulatory	framework	for	FSM	has	recently	been	approved	and	is	
0
20,00
4
6
8
10
2
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U
S
$
Years: April 2015 to March 2025
Revenue Operating & Overhead Costs Net Profit
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
o.
 o
f b
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
Year (Apr.2015 to Mar. 2025)
Actual data Apr. 2015 to Nov.2016
Co ment [SD2]: Baghi	-	to	save	space	I	suggest	deleting	this	-	I	
think	it	can	be	adequately	conveyed	in	the	text,	and	Figures	1	and	2	
are	more	valuable.		
12
WSUP  Water & Sanitation for the Urban Poor
FSM services for low-income customers in 
Lusaka
In the peri-urban areas (PUAs) of Lusaka (Zambia), 
95% of inhabitants rely on pit latrines which are 
prone to fl ooding in the rainy season, posing huge 
health risks to the local population. The largest PUA 
is Kanyama, with a population of over 200,000 
people. Since 2014, Lusaka Water and Sewerage 
Company (LWSC) has been working with the 
community-based entity, Kanyama Water Trust 
(KWT), to introduce one of the fi rst FSM services in 
Africa targeted at and funded by low-income 
customers.   
The service delivery model
The entire FSM chain is managed by KWT under its 
delegated contract with LWSC, with the latter responsible 
for technical support and oversight. The front end of the 
service - emptying, primary transport and transfer - is 
undertaken by contract workers, while secondary transport 
is undertaken by private independent operators of vacuum 
tankers. Treatment and reuse is managed directly by Water 
Trust employees (Figure 9): waste is partially treated at a 
decentralised transfer station, after which it is transported 
and treated on drying beds, with the resulting manure 
packaged and marketed.
Figure 9: FSM service chain, adapted from WSUP’s Urban Programming 
Guide, 2014.
 
Service uptake and affordability
Service offerings were developed using a human-centred 
design process undertaken by the Behaviour Change Lab, 
17 Triggers. In close consultation with LWSC, customers
15  Updated data on the fi nancial performance of the FSM service to May 2017 will be presented in Version 2 of this publication (forthcoming). 
were offered three initial services: 12 drums at 250 Zambia 
Kwacha (ZMK) (US$ 28); 24 drums at 380 ZMK (US$ 43); 
and 32 drums at 450 ZMK (US$ 51). Service uptake and 
willingness-to-pay surveys indicated the pricing was 
affordable for low-income customers: in the fi rst 23 months 
of service, approximately 900 pits serving nearly 25,000 
people were emptied. The lowest band of 12 drums proved 
most popular, with the highest band more likely to be 
requested by institutional customers (e.g. schools or public 
toilets). 
Financial assessment
Performance to date
A rigorous fi nancial analysis of service performance to date 
has been inhibited by a lack of consistent data. Figure 10 
demonstrates that while the fi rst 12 months of operation 
were characterised by low revenues and high expenditure 
(for example, the construction of an additional transfer 
station in Kanyama), a recovery can clearly be seen at the 
18-month mark as the service moved into positive net cash 
fl ow on an O&M basis. However, signifi cant issues with the 
bio-digester in June and July of 2015, as well as operational 
issues at the end of the year, meant that no growth was 
seen for 2015. In 2016 a cholera outbreak led LWSC to call 
a halt on any FSM activities in Kanyama district for several 
months. The system has been up and running effectively 
since the end of the outbreak in mid-2016 but data is yet to 
be analysed.15 
Image: Drying beds for treatment of sludge collected by the FSM service, 
Lusaka. Credit: Gareth Bentley.
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Figure 10: Snapshot of cash ﬂ ow of the FSM service (from operating data 
2013-2014).
Service improvements to strengthen viability
Notwithstanding a number of operational challenges, the 
demonstration phase confi rmed the viability of the service 
to meet FSM needs in PUAs. WSUP is currently supporting 
LWSC and KWT to further strengthen operational effi ciency 
and fi nancial viability, and has recommended the following 
changes be adopted: 1) increasing the price point (the 
amount paid by customers) by around 30%, in line with 
increases that have already been trialled and judged to be 
acceptable to low-income customers; 2) charging a penalty 
of 50 ZMK to repeat customers with a high level of solid 
waste in their pits (this makes emptying the pits more 
diffi cult, undermining operational effi ciency); 3) using a truck 
for all emptying services, even when transport distance is 
less than 500 metres from the bio-digester; and 4) mapping 
and creating a database of toilets to more effectively target 
sales and marketing. 
Projected cash ﬂ ow to 2020
Figure 11 shows a cash fl ow forecast based on the 
imminent adoption of these changes, with conservative 
growth rates: decreasing from 15% in year 1 (2017) to 5% 
by year 5 (2021). The forecast also assumes start-up 
fi nancing of US$ 8,300 (approximately 80,000 ZMK) to 
overcome the initial period of negative net cash fl ow before 
the business develops and generates positive net cash 
fl ows on an O&M basis. The average gross margin 
(percentage of revenue retained after allowing for direct 
costs) during the 5th year is estimated at 37%, a fi gure 
WSUP would consider satisfactory for a start-up sanitation 
business. Given the potential market in Lusaka PUAs, the 
gross margin is expected to rise in line with an expanding 
customer base and increasing revenues.
 Figure 11: Projected cash ﬂ ow for the FSM service, 2017 – 2021. 
This assumes adoption of the recommended changes to the service 
beginning 2017. 
Conclusion
Although improvements can still be made to the institutional 
and regulatory framework for sanitation in Lusaka, the 
existing framework provided an environment to develop a 
FSM model for peri-urban areas. The FSM service is now 
fully established, having proven itself a viable model with 
the potential to scale up if key changes are made. Prior to 
launch the service benefi tted from rigorous 
willingness-to-pay assessments of low-income customers, 
which continue to be monitored and refl ected in revisions to 
the service. Incorporating a demonstration phase helped to 
engage customers and develop demand and provided the 
space to test, assess and identify improvements to critical 
areas of the business model. The conviction of WSUP and 
LWSC in the viability of the model is refl ected in its 
replication in a second PUA, Chazanga. 
The challenges involved in developing FSM services are 
widely acknowledged and should not be underestimated: 
the start-up phase requires targeted support including 
fi nance, appropriate technology and capacity development. 
Once a viable service is established, further challenges 
await in achieving scale while maintaining affordable 
services to the required standard. WSUP believes that 
public-private partnership arrangements can play an 
important role in providing fi nancing support for capital 
works investments; these can be justifi ed by the wider 
economic and health benefi ts (‘public good’) and could be 
provided through municipal fi nance mechanisms or external 
funding (e.g. international funding or equity). 
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Communal sanitation facilities for low-income 
communities in Maputo
In Mozambique’s capital city, Maputo, 90% of the 
population depend on on-site sanitation facilities 
ranging from adequate to almost non-existent. 
Household toilets are diffi cult to provide in many 
parts of the city’s densely populated and congested 
low-income districts (‘bairros’), making shared toilets 
the only viable option for addressing the lack of safe 
sanitation. In 2009 WSUP began trialling a 
communal sanitation service model to respond to 
this urgent need: the model has since become 
embedded within the communities and is actively 
supported by Maputo Municipality (CMM).  
The service delivery model
The fi rst pilot Communal Sanitation Block (CSB) was 
implemented in Chamanculo C in 2009: it served a 
community of 49 families whose only sanitation facility 
previously was an unhygienic single pit latrine. The 
immediate positive impact created momentum to expand 
the model into other areas, as a result of which the model 
was improved and adapted: six standard designs have been 
developed to serve groups of communities ranging from 4 
to 40 households. The model is based on a consultative 
approach and underpinned by a partnership between the 
municipality, the district administration and participating 
communities. Key features of the model are detailed below:
• Site selection based on criteria including needs 
assessment; number of households served; availability 
of municipal land; and willingness of households to 
contribute to capital costs and manage the facility.
• Financial contribution from the municipality, which 
provides suitable land free of cost, waives charges for 
the planning process and approval, and contributes 
towards the capital costs (see Financial assesment).
• Accessibility for connection to the city water 
supply network operated by the water utility, AdeM; 
provision of a water storage tank and tap stand. 
• Provision of ramp and separate compartment to 
ensure access for people with disabilities.
• Capacity building of the Sanitation Management 
Committee (SMC) formed from the user households. 
Women’s participation in these committees is positively 
promoted.16
• A formal delegated management agreement 
between the SMC and the bairro administration for the 
facility - which is a public asset - including operating 
and maintaining the facility.
16   For more on Women’s leadership role in SMCs, see WSUP (2014) A gender-inclusive approach in practice: communal sanitation.
Service uptake and affordability
WSUP’s programme has supported the implementation of 
87 CSBs across 11 bairros during the period 2009 – 2016, 
providing sanitation access to an estimated 1,071 
households with a population of 4,740.  Ongoing monitoring 
activities, including sustainability surveys conducted as part 
of WSUP Annual Programme Reviews, demonstrate 
sustained high usage of the facilities and strong 
performance of the SMCs in maintaining the facilities. 
WSUP has contributed approximately 90% of 
implementation costs to date, with support from its funding 
partners; CMM and household service users contribute the 
remainder (see Figure 12). User households also contribute 
a modest monthly contribution of MZN 50 (around US$ 1): 
this revenue is collected and used by the SMC to cover the 
costs of routine cleaning and maintenance, as well as the 
desludging costs of the septic tank. Table 7 presents a 
summary of the programme outputs.
Image: Communal Sanitation Block in Chamanculo, Maputo. Credit: WSUP
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Table 7: Communal sanitation services 2009-2016.
Bairro CSBs Userhouseholds
Total
people 
reached
1 Chamanculo  C 30 449 2089
2 Xipamanine 8 127 598
3 Mafalala 7 83 396
4 Chamanculo D 13 128 520
5 Chamanculo A 4 34 109
6 Chamanculo B 6 49 172
7 Aeroporto A 1 12 55
8 Minkadjuine 3 39 181
9 Malanga 2 29 110
10 Aeroporto B 12 115 387
11 Munhuana 1 6 25
Total 87 1,071 4,742
Financial assessment
Table 8 provides high-level costing data for constructing 
and operationalising the CSBs. Once the blocks are 
operational, maintenance costs are relatively low as user 
households undertake cleaning through an agreed rota. 
Cleaning and desludging costs are fully covered through the 
monthly user contribution of US$ 1: the latter is particularly 
signifi cant in the Maputo context, where it is unusual for 
households to set aside funds for desludging services. 
CMM and the relevant bairro administration cover the costs 
of repairs.
Table 8: Average costs of constructing and operationalising CSBs. 
Cost component US$
Construction 3840 - 5250
Additional associated costs (planning, 
design, supervision and capacity building) 384 - 525
Total cost per CSB 3,840 – 5,750
Cost per benefi ciary 88
In researching this report, implementation and maintenance 
costs per CSB were calculated based on the actual 
implementation costs of the 87 CSBs and estimated 
maintenance costs. A breakdown of the costs borne is 
provided in Figure 12. WSP has estimated that inadequate 
sanitation costs Mozambique MZN4 billion each year, 
equivalent to US$ 124 million17: the accumulated effect of 
this over a period of 15 years is equivalent to a per capita 
cost of between US$ 125 – 150 based on the estimated 
sanitation coverage by JMP.18 This supports WSUP’s view 
that the investment cost per benefi ciary for the CSB model 
(US$ 88) more than counteracts the impacts and costs due 
to poor sanitation in Maputo, justifying the need for 
municipal and public fi nance for CSBs and shared latrines 
as a public good.
 
17  WSP (2012) Economics of Poor Sanitation in Africa.
18  UNICEF/WHO (2015) 25 Year Progress on Sanitation and Drinking Water: 2015 Update and MDG Assessment.
19  For more on potential fi nancing models for CSBs in Maputo, see WSUP (2011) Financing communal toilets: the Tchemulane project in Maputo. 
Figure 12: Breakdown of average implementation and maintenance costs 
per CSB.
[HH - household; CMM – Municipality; External – contribution from 
external agency  (NGO/IFI/private sector)]
Conclusion
While WSUP will always advocate for the provision of 
household toilets where feasible, experience in Maputo has 
demonstrated that Communal Sanitation Blocks are a 
necessary and viable part of the mix of sanitation service 
solutions in the city’s densely populated low-income 
districts. A key strength of the Maputo model is the 
participatory approach involving households, CMM and the 
bairro administration: the early involvement of these actors 
has helped to ensure collective ownership and consensus 
during implementation. This in turn has contributed to the 
impressive sustainability of the facilities, underpinned by 
ongoing fi nancial contributions from households with 
oversight from SMCs.
WSUP and funding partners have provided the large 
majority of capital investment to date, though with signifi cant 
contributions from households and CMM: for sustainable 
scale-up, it is important to aim for enhanced local fi nancing 
or part-fi nancing of the capital investment19 (as noted, 
analysis of the costs of inadequate sanitation in 
Mozambique suggests this can be justifi ed on economic 
grounds, in addition to the manifest social benefi ts). The 
planned introduction of a sanitation tariff in Maputo would 
be a signifi cant step forward in addressing the fi nancing gap 
for sanitation and working towards the national target of 
universal basic sanitation and hygiene service provision by 
2030. Given the current poor status of sanitation coverage 
in Mozambique and the increasing levels of urbanisation, 
there is overwhelming justifi cation for signifi cant 
investments in sanitation in Maputo: this should include 
support through municipal and/or public fi nance, and should 
be in alignment with the recently completed Maputo 
Sanitation and Drainage Master Plan. 
HH: $114
External: 
$4,268
CMM: $421
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